

PERSPECTIVE

sending “just enough” troops proved a massive error when we occupied Iraq. Postmodern weapons offer us marvelous capabilities, but one is rarely as good as 100, no matter the qualitative difference. Numbers have a power all their own — when your magazine is empty, an enemy armed with a kitchen knife can kill you.

The Navy has already begun, albeit haltingly, to discuss the possible need for more, but smaller, ships. For its part, the Air Force must strive to think beyond its current dogma and ask if a mix of high-tech and mid-tech aircraft might not be more desirable than a severely shrunken fleet of planes so expensive the service dreads losing a single one.

SELF-IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS

The other great requirement for effectiveness in waging full-scale warfare in this new century is to free ourselves of self-imposed restrictions on everything from concepts of “legal” targeting to our dread of shedding even our enemy’s blood. At a time when alternative powers, from terrorist bands to Chinese military thinkers, are constantly broadening their definitions of warfare, we have narrowed our concept of war so severely that we may be astonished (as we were on Sept. 11, 2001) by the breadth of our enemy’s vision and his readiness to reject our narrow rules.

Warfare is not a moral endeavor, and unilateral restrictions will not make it one. The purpose of waging war is to win. All else is secondary. The greatest “combat multiplier” we could have in this new age would be simply an unbreakable will to win, no matter the cost, on the part of our nation’s leaders.

Whether we speak of strategic raids, punitive expeditions or post-modern general wars, only victory is moral. There is no virtue in failure. ■

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ARMY

Army Reserve Staff Sgt. Russell Cotton advises an Iraqi platoon leader on techniques for conducting a combat patrol in Tallafar, Iraq. The new Army Reserve Expeditionary Force strategy is intended to provide a package of units and soldiers ready to deploy within five days of notification.

A component for change

Army Reserve must alter itself to meet anti-terrorism challenge

BY LT. GEN. JAMES R. HELMLY

The first war of the 21st century, the global war on terrorism, presents new challenges for the Army. This war is different than the one for which we prepared ourselves in the latter half of the 20th century.

Unlike the Cold War era, today’s environment abounds with unpredictability and volatility as unconventional and asymmetric threats develop. The Defense Department identifies these emerging security challenges as irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive threats that demand highly trained, rapidly deployable and responsive forces working together as effective partners in a joint and coalition environment.

To meet these challenges, the Army is transforming. Operations

Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have created an environment requiring transformational changes now, even as we continue the battle in the global war on terrorism.

Chief of Staff Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker describes the situation when he talks about the Army’s challenge: “Without the momentum, resources and focus war gives you, it’s very difficult to transform the force. There’s no pressure, no sense of urgency, to do the things you have to do. This is a strategic opportunity to pull the Army into the future.”

The same is true of the Army Reserve. My intent is to use the energy and urgency of Army Transformation and the operational demands of the anti-terrorism war to change from a technically focused, force-in-reserve to a learning or-

ganization that provides trained and ready, “inactive-duty” soldiers poised and available for active service as though they knew the hour and day they would be called. Those unwilling to step up to the challenge will fall behind because we are changing the Army Reserve more than it has changed in the last 50 years.

Since Operation Desert Storm, mobilizations for peacekeeping contingencies in the Balkans and the initial phases of the global war on terrorism have strayed somewhat from the post-Korean War precedent of mobilizing and deploying fully trained reserve units. In current operations, because of a force structure designed for large-scale, linear, conventional operations, the Army Reserve has mobilized parts, or “derivatives,” of units to meet the requirements of combatant commanders. But this method sacrifices unit integrity by breaking units, and leaves no residual capability in these derivative units for unexpected demands.

Despite such challenges, the

RESERVE FORCES

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Army Reserve has thus far mobilized more than 130,000 soldiers for the global war on terrorism, the vast majority being in derivative units. We mobilized some of these units with only three to five days' notice. Nevertheless, the experience of the last three years shows the Army Reserve force needs to be restructured to meet the needs of the Army and the joint force for ready-now, agile, adaptive forces and to provide rotational depth.

We recognize clearly that sustaining this level of support requires drastic, deep, enduring change within the reserve, greater than anytime in our past. Such monumental change requires a profound, fundamental shift in our mind-set as we "lean out" our command-and-control structure, create rotational depth and responsiveness through force generation models, and implement human resource management structures that recognize the needs of our most valuable resource, the soldier.

MODULAR FORCE

The Army is restructuring to improve strategic responsiveness and capability across the spectrum of conflict. To do this, the service must reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with staying power and durability.

As Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey and Gen. Schoomaker note in the 2005 Army Posture Statement: "We are restructuring from a division-based to a brigade-based force. These brigades are designed as modules, or self-sufficient and standardized Brigade Combat Teams, that can be more readily deployed and combined with other Army and joint forces to meet the precise needs of the combatant commanders. This program, called modularity, increases the combat power of the active component by 30 percent as well as the size of the overall pool of available forces by 60 percent."

This modular force model enables the Army to rapidly tailor capabilities to requirements and permit the combatant commander to maximize use of war-fighting skill

sets. The modular force provides more training time, more predictable deployment schedules and a sustainable supply of ready forces to combatant commanders.

Modularity provides sustainability and predictability in using reserve forces (while avoiding wholesale cross-leveling and its inevitable detrimental impacts), improves management efficiency, and focuses training on skills and specialties required by the combatant commanders rather than on peacetime requirements.

RESTRUCTURE, RE-BALANCE

To be positioned to effectively support the Army's Force-Generation model, the Reserve first needed to restructure forces, rebalance skill inventories and streamline command-and-control — imperatives undertaken when we imple-

mented the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative in 2003. These mirror major initiatives underway throughout the rest of the Army. These processes are being pursued while we are at war, and they are complex, intricate, time-consuming and require

much coordination. Yet, once completed, they enable us to respond more effectively to the challenges that must be met, while simultaneously fighting a war.

Because many of our military formations were still specifically structured to respond to the Cold War, we became aware of dysfunctions in the way Army Reserve assets were aligned to meet the current threat. Our legacy force structure was being stressed to a degree, and at a frequency, we could not sustain unless we changed deeply the way we provide forces.

This was particularly true in some military specialties that were assigned entirely, or nearly so, to the reserve components. Military police, transportation, petroleum and water distribution, civil affairs and psychological operations units were among those finding themselves spread thin by constant, increasing demands for their specialized support services.



As a result of an analysis ordered by the defense secretary in 2003, the military services undertook a comprehensive rebalancing of their forces and components to relieve stress on certain high-demand, low-density units, particularly those found primarily in the reserve components. Rebalancing focuses Total Army assets on current and emerging missions. It allows us to trim obsolete force structure and convert it to directly usable forces to meet missions that would otherwise require more frequent, repetitive mobilizations and deployments.

The rebalancing plan paves the path to modularity. It provides a way to successfully regenerate and restructure the force, creating a flexible, optimized and modular Army Reserve that provides stability and predictability.

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Key to building and sustaining a campaign-quality Army Reserve for today's contemporary, dynam-

ic operating environment involves managing forces through a rotational process. A cyclic time-phased model applies resources to achieve increasingly higher levels of readiness.

The Army Reserve has partnered closely with the active Army in developing the Army Force Generation model by developing the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force, or AREF. The model enables the entire Army to operate more efficiently over extended periods, providing combatant commanders with required capabilities while building in cyclic rest-and-reconstitution functions.

During the past year, we have conducted extensive rotational-model feasibility studies. We are analyzing the impact of the AREF force-management model across the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, leadership, material, personnel and facilities disciplines.

Over the past three years, the



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mix of force capabilities required by the combatant commander evolved into the request-for-forces process, which has replaced the use of tiered deployment of forces to the combat theater. This new way of providing forces gives flexibility to the combatant commander — as it should — to meet the volatile demands of 21st-century war fighting.

The effect in the Army Reserve was felt in how we resource requirements. The AREF strategy provides the answer because the model enables us to pursue “packaged and cyclic” resourcing of capabilities instead of “tiered” resourcing against a time-phased force deployment list.

The AREF rotational force consists of 10 Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREPs); the first two like-structured packages will be prepared for deployment by the end of this year. When completed, the majority of reserve units will be assigned to one of the

10 packages.

Each package contains a number of combat support and combat service-support units and moves through a progressive readiness cycle. These packages move through various levels of readiness from regenerate and restructuring to a period of high readiness for deployment.

The intended result is a package of units and soldiers ready and available to deploy within five days of notification. Fully implemented, these packages will provide rotational depth to the Army, spread the operational tempo across the force, and add predictability for soldiers, families and their employers. They will also add a degree of sustainability for unit readiness not present today.

EXPEDITIONARY PACKAGES

Under the AREF strategy, the Army Reserve plans for recurring five-year cycles organized as follows:

A soldier of the Army Reserve's 810th Military Police Company

signals that he is ready to move out on an early-morning convoy security mission.

■ In year five, units will be in re-fit, reconstitute, reset mode with an emphasis on individual training.

■ Moving into year four, units conduct increasingly complex collective training, ranging from squad and section level to detachment and platoon level.

■ In years three and two, units begin to coalesce while they train at company and higher levels, leading to validation and certification at their highest level of organization.

■ Finally, in year one, the unit trains to sustain its capabilities at the highest readiness levels. Resources must be available during this period so that the unit remains prepared to be called to active duty within 120 hours of notification.

The AREF force-management strategy requires a shift to a new training model — train-alert-deploy.

This strategy will allow the Army Reserve to cyclically prepare units for mission performance on “Day One.” To support this, we synchronize existing and anticipated equipment needs by shifting to cyclic resource priorities and aligning equipment availability to AREF cyclic training needs.

As units progress through each year of the five-year cycle, their state of readiness increases. Units in year one, those ready to deploy, are at the highest level of readiness.

Units in year five, those reconstituting from a deployment, are at the lowest level. Units in the window for deployment receive full complements of modernized equipment compatible with active-component equipment.

This way, we locate the equipment where it is needed most — to the units heading for deployment.

In today's strategic environment, it is impossible to absolutely predict what will happen and what will be required of the reserve components. Each conflict brings its own unique set of requirements and challenges.

War is, by nature, unpredictable, dirty, dangerous and lethal. The AREF strategy seeks to provide an increased level of mobilization predictability to the greatest extent possible, both for the combatant commander and for the soldier.

AREF portends a revolutionary change for the Army Reserve. Transitioning our force to this new way of organizing, training, equipping and mobilizing marks a tough course of action, but the benefits will strengthen our force in the long run. The reserve soldier will gain predictability for his or her family and employer and, in those years leading up to year one, a more equitable application of resources for training and readiness.

The Army Reserve will gain flexibility of its force and the maximum use of limited resources.

The Army and combatant commanders will gain visibility and readiness predictability through packages of units with known, highly ready combat support and combat service-support skill sets, and additional surge capability when dictated by operational requirements.

Why are we doing this? Certainly for the reasons mentioned previously, but also for our soldiers. Any success attributed to the reserve during this global war is due to the service, sacrifice and courage of our soldiers — brave men and women who have answered the nation's call to duty.

As leaders of America's sons and daughters, we must step up to the plate and change the institution.

We must change the Army Reserve — now. ■

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